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ABSTRAK 
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisa pengaruh dari Non-Performing Financing (NPF) 
pembiayaan Mudharabah dan pembiayaan Musyarakah dan kepemilikan bank terhadap 
profitabilitas pada bank umum syariah. Penelitian ini menggunakan populasi sebanyak 13 
bank syariah, namun karena keterbatasan kelengkapan data, maka sampel yang digunakan 
hanya 7 bank syariah pada periode 2012-2016. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa Non 
Performing Financing (NPF) pembiayaan Mudharabah dan pembiayaan Musyarakah 
memiliki pengaruh signifikan negatif terhadap profitabilitas (ROA). Hasil penelitian ini 
menunjukkan bahwa ada kredit macet (NPL) yang dapat mengurangi profitabilitas bank 
syariah dalam pembiayaan Mudharabah dan pembiayaan Musyarakah meskipun jumlah 
pendanaannya sangat kecil dibandingkan dengan pembiayaan Murabahah. Sedangkan 
variabel kepemilikan bank tidak mempengaruhi profitabilitas bank syariah  
 
Kata Kunci : Non Performing Financing, Pembiayaan Mudharabah, Pembiayaan 
Musharakah, Profitabilitas. 
 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose This study to analyze the effect of Non Performing Financing of mudharabah 
financing and musyarakah financing and bank ownership on profitability at Sharia 
Commercial Bank. The population in this study as many as 13 sharia banks but due to the 
limitations of the completeness of the data then the sample in this study taken 7 Sharia Banks 
period 2012-2016. The results showed that Non Performing Financing Mudharabah financing 
and Non Performing Financing Musyarakah financing have a significant negative effect on 
Profitability (ROA). The results of this study indicate that there are non-performing loans that 
can reduce the profitability of sharia banks in mudharabah and musyarakah financing 
although the amount of funding is very small compared to murabahah financing. While the 
variable ownership of the bank does not affect the profitability of sharia banks. 
 
Keywords : Non Performing Financing, Mudharabah Financing, Musharaka financing, 
Profitability. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Both Islamic banks and 
conventional banks are financial 
intermediation that helps to transfer the 
funds from investors, depositors or 
savers to borrowers. Regular 
conventional banks cannot be involved 
in venture transactions or merchandizing 
transactions, which is allowed in Islamic 
banks. But there are merchant banks who 
are allowed to do merchandizing. The 
main difference between Islamic banks 
and conventional banks are the practice 
of interest rate and speculative 
transactions, investment in alcohol, in 
tobacco and in pig made products are 
prohibited in accordance with Islamic 
principles. Generally, conventional 
banking principles are man-made, 
whereas in Islamic banks principles and 
rules are based on Syariah who set up 
the principles, simply to say transactions 
of Islamic banks are based on profit and 
loss sharing. As we are aware of, that 
interest rate for conventional banks is 
main source of earnings. As a proof, 
interest is forbidden in not only Islam 
and in Christianity as well. Likewise, as 
it is being stated in Quran chapter 3, 
verse 130  ” O you who have believed, 
do not consume usury, doubled and 
multiplied, but fear Allah that you may 
be successful.” And another proof in 
Quran chapter 2, verse 275 is “Allah has 
permitted trade and has forbidden 
interest. Unlike Islamic Banks, the 
conventional banks are not allowed to 
purchase commodities with the aim of 
reselling them, in other words it is 
forbidden for them to buy capital assets 
or fixed assets such as: building, tracks, 
cars, machineries with the purpose to 
resell them with mark up unless they do 
not use for their own. 
The extent of literature on 
Islamic banking divided into theoretical 
and empirical dimension. The earliest 
works dealing with the potential of 
Islamic banking include Mannan (1968), 
Ahmad (1987), Saeed (1996) and Iqbal 
and Mirakhor (1999). These authors 
discussed a wide range of institutional 
issues including concepts and principles 
that are subject to interpretation. Due to 
the rapid growth in Islamic banking in 
these recent decades, it calls for 
opportunities for the academics to 
conduct study in analyzing its’ financial 
performance using financial ratios. Some 
previous studies investigated 
performance of Islamic banks and 
compare it with conventional banks 
performance (Samad, 1999; Samad and 
Hassan, 2000; Iqbal, 2001; Rosly  and 
Bakar, 2003; Samad, 2004; Kader et. al, 
2007; Widagdo and Ika; 2007;  Beck et 
al., 2010; Jaffar and Manarvi, 2011; 
Ansari and Rehman, 2011; Wahidudin at 
al., 2012; Merchant, 2012;  Zeitun, 2012; 
Babatunde and Olaitan, 2013) 
The research result was 
conducted by Kithinji (2010), Kargi 
(2011), Kolapo et al. (2012), Muhammad 
et al (2012), Samuel et al. (2012), 
Madishetti, and Rwechungura (2013) 
and Kingu et al (2018) found that the 
NPL bank have negative influence 
toward bank performance. The research 
result was conducted by Reaz (2005),  
Berger et al. (2005),  Omran (2007),  
Micco et al. (2007), Iannotta et al. 
(2007), Fu and Heffernan (2008), and 
Cornett et al. (2010) found that the 
ownership structure of private bank have 
positive influence or significance toward 
bank performance, from that research 
can be shown that the private bank is 
better than government bank. In 
Indonesia, the research was done by 
Hadad et al. (2005) found that bank 
ownership has no effect on performance 
of private bank, government bank and 
foreign bank. Thus, the research on the 
performance of private banks and 
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government banks in Indonesia is very 
reasonable to be examined.  
Generally, the basic motive for 
this study is that, different studies were 
done in Western Europe and East 
African countries (Saba et al. (2012), 
Louzis et al. (2010), Badar and Yasmin 
(2013) and Moti et al. (2012). However, 
the results of those studies were 
inconsistent. This inconsistency of 
results might be attributable to the 
method of data analysis used by different 
researchers and difference in the 
economic condition of the countries in 
which banking sectors are operating. 
Though, there are a number of studies 
that are conducted at a global level to 
examine the determinants of bank 
performance, most of the studies were 
made with reference to developed 
countries like India, China, Japan, 
Turkey, United of Kindom, Spain, 
Greece, German, Malaysia and USA.  
In previous literature, a lot of 
work is done on determining the factors 
which influence the bank performance in 
Indonesia. But a little work is done on of 
sharia banks. Studies in Indonesia, so far 
have looked into the performance of 
conventional banks but did not study the 
effect of nonperforming loan and 
ownership structure on the performance 
of sharia banks. So, the main purpose of 
this study is to fill this gap by 
performance of sharia banks.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Financial Intermediary Theory 
The main function of the bank is as a 
financial intermediary where the bank 
will sell a financial claiming product on 
the bank such as savings account and 
current account. At the same time, banks 
will also purchase financial products 
such as mortgages, business loans and 
personal loans. With this activity the 
financial transfers occur from units with 
surplus funds to units with insufficient 
funds through financial intermediaries. 
Financial intermediaries have advantages 
over individual or non-financial 
companies due to three factors. First, 
financial institutions or intermediaries 
can reduce transaction costs such as 
search costs, information costs and 
contract costs. The cost of information 
exists because there is one party who 
does not know exactly about the 
information related to the other party. 
There are two situations of 
asymmetric information in financial 
markets ie adverse selection, which 
occurs before a transaction occurs, and 
the moral hazard, which arises after a 
transaction (Allen & Santomero, 1998). 
Adverse selection occurs when the 
surplus unit has no accurate information 
regarding unit deficit. Therefore, the lack 
of information about the deficit unit will 
expose the surplus unit to greater risk if 
the surplus unit lend to a deficit unit. 
Financial institutions through experience 
can reduce the adverse selection 
problem. 
Moral hazard refers to the misuse of 
the loan obtained by the deficit unit 
where the deficit unit will use the loan 
for a more risky and different purpose 
than the stated purpose of the loan 
application. Financial institutions can 
mitigate moral hazard problems through 
loan contracts and oversight over the 
operations of deficit units. 
The advantage of the second 
financial institution is that financial 
institutions can enjoy economies of scale 
as financial institutions have the ability 
to handle large and large-scale 
transactions. Therefore, financial 
institutions can reduce the fixed cost for 
each unit of output. Thirdly, since 
financial institutions have the advantage 
of evaluating a decent loan deal, it 
ensures that the loan issued will have a 
lower risk. Furthermore, financial 
institutions will manage a large amount 
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of loans. Thus, financial institutions can 
diversify their portfolio and thus reduce 
the risk of such financial institutions. 
This is different from those of non-
financial intermediaries or companies 
who do not have the skills in assessing a 
loan and do not have a large capital to 
diversify their portfolio.  
Agency Theory  
In the area of study of the influence 
of ownership on bank performance, the 
most frequently used theory is agency 
theory. Agency theory describes the 
relationship between the owner as a 
principal and manager as an agent. The 
relationship is very important because it 
affects the performance of a bank. Thus 
the competitiveness of a bank depends 
largely on the ability of managers to 
manage their respective banks. In 
addition to the magnitude of the role of 
managers in managing the bank in order 
to perform well, the role of the bankers 
is also vital for monitoring and ensuring 
that managers are working hard to 
advance the bank under its management. 
Therefore, in the relationship 
between the bank owner and the 
manager usually there will be a 
performance contract where the bank 
owners are aligning the interests of the 
manager with the interests of the bank's 
owner. Performance contracts are 
formed so that rewards received by 
managers are closely linked to bank 
performance. The contractual 
relationship between the owner and the 
manager is in line with agency theory 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) reveal that the 
difference in importance between owners 
and managers that creates an agency 
conflict occurs because the manager 
does not hold company shares or has 
insufficient ownership. 
The concept of agency as disclosed 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) can be 
seen in the results of the study of Berger 
and Bonnaccorsi (2006), Basu et al. 
(2007) and Sulivan and Spong (2007) 
which indicate that bank owners are 
handing over to the manager as an agent 
to manage the bank. This is because the 
owner has difficulty managing the 
company directly because of the 
following factors. First, the size of a 
growing bank will be difficult to 
manage. Second, the need for specialized 
expertise to manage large banks and 
generally the owners have no such 
expertise. Third, bank ownership is 
determined by the number of 
shareholders. If the number of 
shareholders is too high and each person 
holds a small number of shares then this 
situation does not allow all owners to 
manage the activities of banks 
effectively. 
The manager can be seen as an agent 
by the bank owner who appoints them 
and is authorized and responsible for 
making the best decisions in the interest 
of shareholders. One way to measure 
success and efficiency of managers is to 
look at the profitability of the bank. 
Performance can be measured through 
bank's ability to secure a stable profit 
while at the same time maintaining 
shareholder wealth increase in the 
company. 
Berger and Bonnaccorsi (2006) point 
out that managers may ignore the 
interests of shareholders, instead paying 
attention to their interests such as job 
continuity, luxury lifestyle, professional 
membership, personal vehicle facilities, 
all of which are borne by the company. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) stipulate to 
address agency issues, shareholders have 
incentives to monitor managers so as to 
minimize the problem of principal-
agents. However, the level of incentives 
depends on shareholder ownership. If the 
owner holds a small number of shares, 
the owner will not have the incentive to 
monitor the manager's behavior. This is 
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because the profit earned by the owner is 
less than the cost of supervision. 
Therefore, it is expected that private 
banks, most of which are owned by a 
family, will have a better performance 
compared to government-owned banks. 
For a bank that is largely owned by 
the family, conflicts between bank 
owners and managers are rare. Arifin 
(2003) notes that when a majority of the 
shares are owned by the family, it 
reduces the agency's problems compared 
to companies owned by many 
shareholders. In Indonesia, 90 percent of 
the company's shares are owned and 
operated by a family. This situation is 
not much different from other countries 
such as Spain (La Porta et al., 1999). 
Arifin (2003) states that the advantages 
of a family owned and operated 
company are family members will 
manage the company and this will 
reduce agency problems. However, 
because a family is also a manager of the 
company, the agency problem will arise 
between the family, as a majority 
shareholder and a minority shareholder. 
In addition, according to Allen et al. 
(2011) bank capital also affects the 
performance of a bank. Due to the large 
capital of private banks in Indonesia 
issued by individuals or families, they 
have higher incentives to monitor loans 
issued due to bank performance and their 
wealth will be affected by repayments 
 Government-owned companies 
may not be efficiently managed because 
the board and management do not hold 
any shares in the company. This causes 
the company's performance to be 
affected (Megginson, et al, 1994; 
Megginson & Netter, 2001). The agency 
problem in the context of government 
ownership is more complicated as the 
government holds shares in the company 
on behalf of the public or the people. 
Since governments are led by politicians 
who have no ownership in these 
companies, they may not monitor the 
actions of the board of directors or 
management. In addition, the objective 
of a politician who leads a government 
may differ from an individual who owns 
a business. Shleifer (1998) and La Porta 
et al. (2002) states that governments tend 
to meet political goals that may 
negatively affect the financial 
performance of the company. This view 
is supported by Paskelian (2006) and Xu 
and Wang (1999) stating that the 
company becomes inefficient due to an 
agency problem arising from 
government political motives. In 
addition, government-owned banks may 
have lower profits because they finance a 
project that does not bring financial gain 
but brings social benefits. 
The existing studies have proved 
that poorer loan quality and high NPLs 
are mainly associated with government 
owned banks (Berger et al. 2005 and 
Iannota et al. 2007). Iannota et al. (2007) 
also concluded that privately owned 
banks are more profitable than 
government owned and mutual banks. 
They also found that among mutual, 
private and public banks, publicly owned 
banks has the highest NPLs and bad loan 
quality whereas mutual banks has lowest 
NPLs and high quality loans. 
Furthermore, Micco et al. (2007) have 
found that privately owned banks has the 
better performance than all other banks 
in developing countries. They also find 
that the state owned banks have higher 
costs and lower profitability as compared 
to the private banks, whereas opposite is 
the case for foreign owned banks. 
De Nicolo (2001) and Iannota et al.  
(2007) have suggested that state-owned 
banks typically exhibit higher risk than 
other types of banks. Micco et al. (2004), 
analyze financial institutions with 
different ownership types covering 119 
countries. He concludes that non 
performing loans tend to be higher for 
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banks with state ownership than for other 
groups. Hu et al. (2004) use a panel of 
Taiwanese banks and find a positive 
correlation between capital share owned 
by the state and the level of non- 
performing loans. However, Garcia-
Marco and Robles-Fernandez (2007) 
investigating the relationship between 
risk taking and ownership structure 
document that commercial banks 
(mainly private owned) are more 
exposed to risk than deposit banks 
(mainly state owned).  
Ahmad (2013) investigate of 
commercial banks currently operating in 
Pakistan. Currently there are 30 
commercial banks operating in Pakistan 
which can be divided into three broad 
categories i.e., public sector, private 
sector and foreign banks. The studies 
have  found the positive association 
between NPLs and publically owned or 
dispersed ownership (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986; Berger et al., 2005; 
Iannota et al., 2007; and Nichols et al., 
2009). 
Tehulu and Olana (2014) 
investigate the bank specific 
determinants of credit risk of Ethiopian 
commercial banks. For this reason causal 
research design was applied in this study 
since the objective is to assess cause 
effect relationship. The sample consists 
of a panel of ten (10) commercial banks 
that were registered before 2007 from 
around 19 banks operating in the 
country. The period 2007-2011 was 
chosen just to examine the determinants 
of credit risk using recent data and 
recently established banks were not 
considered to avoid new entrant bias.  
The studies have found the ownership 
has a impact on credit risk. This finding 
shows that government banks were more 
risky than private banks. 
Boudriga et al. (2009) investigate The  
aggregate banking, financial, economic, 
and legal environment data for a panel of 
59 countries over the period 2002-2006. 
It develops a comprehensive model to 
explain differences in the level of NPLs 
between countries. To assess the role of 
regulatory supervision on credit risk, the 
paper uses several interactions between 
institutional features and regulatory 
devices. The studies have  found The 
government property are positive and 
significant, which indicates that state-
ownership rises the level of problem 
loans. This could be explained either by 
the development mandate given to state-
owned banks, especially in developing 
countries, or by their weaker credit 
recovery capacities. These combined 
effects lead to higher credit risk taking 
and to increased defaults. This result 
corroborates those of Micco et al. (2004) 
who conclude that NPLs tend to be 
higher for state-owned banks on a panel 
of emerging countries.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
The population in this study as 
many as 13 sharia banks but due to the 
limitations of the completeness of the 
data then the sample in this study 7 
Sharia Banks period 2012-2016. The 
data are taken from banks’ annual 
reports. In this study using panel data 
and using pooled ordinary least square 
(OLS). To test if Islamic Banking Unit 
influences performance of banks, the 
following model is estimated: 
  
ROAit = β0 + β1NFLMUDit + β2 
NFLMUSit + β3*DGOVit +eit  
Where i refers to the bank, t refers to the 
years: 
Penjelasan:  
ROAit : 
Return on assets of 
bank i in period t, 
NFLMUDit : 
Non Performing 
Financing 
mudharabah  
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NFLMUSit : 
Non Performing 
Financing 
Musyarakah 
DGOVit : 
Dummy variable 
taking the value 1 for 
government bank and 
0 for otherwise bank. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
Table 1. Comparisons of Mean of Selected Variables between Different Systems 
of Banks 
Ratios Means all bank (%) Means (%) p-Value (2 tailed) 
ROA 0.600   
Private banks  0.839 Ns 
Government banks  0.421  
    
NFLMUD 2.534  Ns 
Private banks  2.565  
Government banks  2.511  
    
NFLMUS 3.513  ns 
Private banks  2.797  
Government banks  4.051  
 
a,b,c, or ns shows that the mean 
difference of a variable between private 
and government banks is significant at 
either 1%, 5%, 10%, or not significant at 
all. Table 1 shows the average ROA of 
all sharia banks of 0.6%. The ROA of 
private sharia banks is higher than the 
shariah banks owned by the government 
ie 0.839% and 0.421% respectively. 
there is no significant difference in the 
ROA of sharia banks owned by the 
private sector with government property. 
Average NFL mudharabah Islamic banks 
amounted to 2534%, there is no 
significant difference NFL mudharabah 
sharia private banks with government 
property. Meanwhile, NFL musharakah 
is higher than the average NFL 
musharakah that is equal to 3,513%. nor 
is there a significant difference between  
the NFLs of private sharia banks and 
government property even though the 
NFLs of Islamic banks are higher than 
those of private-owned banks. Higher 
NFL musharakah compared with NFL 
mudharabah due to poor understanding 
of the nature of business customers. Less 
customer financial evaluation, sales 
projection does not take into account 
business habits and less take into account 
the aspect of competitors. Insufficient 
evaluation of the customer account. 
Rarely visit the customer's project site so 
that side streaming and customer 
problems can not be detected early on. 
On the customer side there are still 
dishonest, increasing consumption 
patterns and excessive lifestyle. 
unprofessional management. Unable to 
solve business problems, not mastering 
projects and losing out in competing.
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Table 2. Ordinary Least Square  Result Dependent Variable: ROA 
Variable 
Ordinary Least Square  
Coef. p-value 
Constan 1.960 000*** 
NFLMUD -.219 .050** 
NFLMUS -.229 .001*** 
DGOV -.575 .527 
   
R-squared 0.542  
Adjusted R-squared 0.513  
Prob > F  0.0000  
Number observation 35  
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, p-value in 
parentheses 
 
The result of regression method 
above shows variable of NFLMUD and 
NFLMUS have significant effect on 
ROA. These results indicate that the two 
variables play a significant role in 
determining the level of ROA in sharia 
banks in Indonesia by 51.3%. 
NFL MUD and NFL MUS have a 
negative effect on ROA. it indicates that 
the loss of income opportunity (income) 
from the credit given, thus reducing the 
profitability and adversely affect the 
profitability of banks. NPLs in sharia 
banks result in banks having to provide 
large write-off of accounts receivable, so 
the ability to give credit becomes very 
limited and if uncollectible it will result 
in losses. Second, liquidity is the 
problem of high mobility of public funds 
so that banks have to do stimuli such as 
high profit-sharing rate in order to 
recover community funds back. This 
finding supports information asymmetry 
theory and bad management hypothesis 
which argues that NPL is the result of 
adverse selection, and is linked to 
management inability to control 
operating efficiency which in the run run  
leads to decrease in profitability. 
Therefore, the results support the higher 
the nonperforming loans, the lower the 
ROA. The results are consistent with the 
findings of Kithinji (2010), Kargi 
(2011), Kolapo et al. (2012), Muhammad 
et al (2012), Samuel et al. (2012), 
Madishetti, and Rwechungura (2013) 
and Kingu et al (2018). 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose This study to 
analyze the effect of Non Performing 
Financing mudharabah financing and 
musyarakah financing and bank 
ownership of profitability at Sharia 
Commercial Bank. The results showed 
that Non Performing Financing 
Mudharabah financing and Non 
Performing Financing Musyarakah 
financing have a significant negative 
effect on Profitability (ROA). The results 
of this study indicate that there are non-
performing loans that can reduce the 
profitability of sharia banks in 
mudharabah and musyarakah financing 
although the amount of funding is very 
small compared to murabahah financing. 
NFL MUD and NFL MUS have a 
negative effect on ROA. it indicates that 
the loss of income opportunity (income) 
from the credit given, thus reducing the 
profitability and adversely affect the 
profitability of banks. NPLs in sharia 
banks result in banks having to provide 
large write-off of accounts receivable, so 
the ability to give credit becomes very 
limited and if uncollectible it will result 
in losses. Second, liquidity is the 
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problem of high mobility of public funds 
so that banks have to do stimuli such as 
high profit-sharing rate in order to 
recover community funds back.While 
the variable ownership of the bank does 
not affect the profitability of sharia 
banks. 
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